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Language, Pain, and Fear Gerald L. Bruns 
ROUSSEAU BELIEVED that human language originated in the 
expression of fear. Here is his version (from the Essay on the Origin of Languages) 
of what happened: 
A primitive man, on meeting other men, will first have experienced 
fright. His fear will make him see these men as larger and stronger 
than himself; he will give them the name giants. After many 
experiences, he will discover that the supposed giants are neither 
larger nor stronger than himself, and that their stature did not 
correspond to the word giant. He will then invent another name 
that he has in common with them, such as, for example, the word 
man, and will retain the word giant for the false object that impressed 
him while he was being deluded. 
Notice that man's first word does not refer to the world; it gives shape to 
fear?it gives fear the shape of a giant, makes fear metaphorically visible. And 
it is in terms of this giant, that is, in terms of the metaphor or figure of giant, 
that man first names himself. He is himself the literal meaning of the metaphor 
giant; that is, he is the literal meaning of his own fear. 
This wonderful idea provokes another: Suppose it were the case that in every 
human utterance there remained some original deposit of fear?some metaphorical 
residue of that primitive panic which accompanied or perhaps even caused the 
first appearance of words. One could therefore speak of fear as the hidden 
meaning of all human speech, as if it were so that the very words I am speaking 
now contained a secret 
expression of fear. Fear is the latent content of human 
speech, the secret of its origin and use. This would mean that language is the 
language of fear. Fear requires no special language, no special style or figure, 
because it is the native ingredient of speech itself, part of that which makes 
a thing what it is (on the principle that whatever is part of the origin of a thing 
is also part of its nature). 
It is in the nature of what is hidden to break out into the open, as when 
fear takes over language completely?throws off its disguise and turns speech 
into a scream. I once knew a man who counted the screams he heard during 
the day. He said: "The scream of joy is merely a bad song." A true scream 
requires great scrutiny. One of the things you can learn from a scream is that 
fear is unspeakable, like God. It is expressible, to be sure: you can see it 
immediately when it writes itself across the face of one of your children, 
especially the most vulnerable one. But you can never say what it is. The true 
scream is wordless because fear cannot be put into words. The person who says 
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he is afraid of something has merely adopted a certain manner of speaking. 
The truly frightened person can tell you very little. Hence the genius of fear, 
which can express itself without ever giving itself away. It communicates itself 
in the manner of a disease, and can of course consume a whole people. I am 
talking about dumb fear, which is at once plain and mysterious, like a perfect 
meaning. It is something no one misunderstands. 
Fear is the perfect metaphor of pain: the meanings of these two phenomena 
shuttle back and forth, turning the one thing into the other. Here let me refer 
you to Wittgenstein, who said: "The philosopher's treatment of a question is 
like the treatment of an illness." Wittgenstein knew that real questions are 
incurable: you do not really do anything about them?mainly you think about 
them. For example, Wittgenstein wanted to know: What would you do if you 
had a pain but no word to express it? The question is not hypothetical, because 
pain cannot be put into words. The word "earache," for example, expresses 
no pain. What do words know about pain? Physicians know about pain: the 
physician is the reader of pain. Pain is the informing spirit of his literacy, but 
notice that for the physician the word "earache" expresses, not pain, but some 
defect of structure or tissue. The physician's job is to see through pain, 
presumably to arrive at its cause or to know the true companion of its 
appearance, but this means that pain as such has for him the character of 
something that makes sense on paper, whereas, of course, for the one who feels 
it there may be no sense to be made of it at all. 
You can learn from Wittgenstein that the meaning of a word lies in its use 
in a situation, not in its reference to something real. The word "earache" does 
not 
require a real earache for it to make sense: an earache is not the meaning 
of the word "earache." From a physician's point of view this is how it works: 
to find out the meaning of a word requires you to study the situation in which 
it is used, whence you may learn that something has gone wrong and requires 
to be healed. Meanings always repose in situations, not in words. 
The patient may feel, however, that, as logicians used to say, matters 
differently obtain, as when pain endures past the point of healing. An earache 
has a particular tenacity in this respect?it can transcend its cause: it aspires 
not to be the cry of its occasion; it is often intransitive, existing on its own, 
not meant to be interpreted. It is independent of all defects: a free pain. 
An old Jesuit, a man of unspeakable cunning, once said to me: "All men 
are the servants of pain. We are its principal medium." 
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